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Despite increasing interest in transnational fields, transnational commons have received little attention. In contrast toeconomic models of commons, which argue that commons occur naturally and are prone to collective inaction and
tragedy, we introduce a social constructionist account of commons. Specifically, we show that actor-level frame changes can
eventually lead to the emergence of an overarching, hybrid “commons logic” at the field level. These frame shifts enable
actors with different logics to reach a working consensus and avoid “tragedies of the commons.” Using a longitudinal
analysis of key actors’ logics and frames, we tracked the evolution of the global climate change field over 40 years. We
bracketed time periods demarcated by key field-configuring events, documented the different frame shifts in each time
period, and identified five mechanisms (collective theorizing, issue linkage, active learning, legitimacy seeking, and catalytic
amplification) that underpin how and why actors changed their frames at various points in time—enabling them to move
toward greater consensus around a transnational commons logic. In conclusion, the emergence of a commons logic in a
transnational field is a nonlinear process and involves satisfying three conditions: (1) key actors view their fates as being
interconnected with respect to a problem issue, (2) these actors perceive their own behavior as contributing to the problem,
and (3) they take collective action to address the problem. Our findings provide insights for multinational companies,
nation-states, nongovernmental organizations, and other stakeholders in both conventional and unconventional commons.
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Introduction
An increasing number of societal issues appear to fit
what Garrett Hardin identified in 1968 as the “tragedy
of the commons.” Most conceptualizations of commons
subscribe to an essentialist view, in which a commons is
a large-scale environmental or social system consisting
of natural or cultural resources and ideas, the benefits
of which are readily accessible to all and thus prone to
misuse, underinvestment, and free riding (Olson 1965,
Ostrom 1990). Oceans are an example of a “conven-
tional” commons, whereas the Internet is an “uncon-
ventional” commons (Van Laerhoven and Ostrom 2007).
Examples of such commons problems include over-
fishing in conventional commons and digital piracy in
unconventional commons. As Hardin (1968, p. 1244)
noted, “Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all.”
In contrast to this essentialist view, we adopt an insti-
tutional perspective on commons, where a commons is
a field-level logic that is socially constructed by vari-
ous actors. Although studies of social dilemmas such as
commons have long fascinated economists and behav-
ioral decision theorists (Weber et al. 2004), they have
received far less attention from organizational theorists.
On the rare occasions that organizational scholars have
theorized about commons, their focus has remained at
the national level, as exemplified by Holm’s (1995)
study of fisheries in Norway and Barnett and King’s
(2008) research on chemical firms’ reputations in the
United States (US). Yet many crucial commons issues
warrant investigation, particularly those at the transna-
tional level, which have drawn even less attention from
organizational theorists. Transnational commons pose
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challenging managerial issues if the predicted tragedy
of the commons is to be avoided, because construc-
tions of transnational commons (e.g., the atmosphere and
cyberspace) require conceptualizations that span national
boundaries and transcend levels of analysis (Djelic and
Quack 2008). Additionally, institutional governance pro-
cesses at the transnational level dramatically increase
in complexity compared with those in other fields, as
no overarching governing authority exists to prescribe
the rules of the game for relevant stakeholders, such as
sovereign nation-states, nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs), and multinational companies (MNCs) (Holder
and Flessas 2008, Ostrom et al. 1999). Yet theoriza-
tion about institutional processes in transnational fields,
especially transnational commons, remains in its infancy
(Glasbergen et al. 2007, Maguire and Hardy 2006, Wijen
and Ansari 2007).
In the classic economic perspective, where commons’
users are cast as rational actors (Olson 1965), commons
can only be governed through centralized legislation; the
imposition of full property rights through privatization
(Hardin 1998); or localized voluntary communal solu-
tions, based on trust, reciprocity, and reputation (e.g.,
Ostrom et al. 1999). However, in transnational com-
mons, which span national borders and require global
coordination, all of these solutions may be impossible or
insufficient to address commons problems. Remarkably,
and contrary to the “logic of collective action,” which
predicts a tendency to free ride in such projects (Olson
1965), in certain cases collective action to avert the
tragedy of the commons has emerged at the transnational
level (Djelic and Sahlin-Andersson 2006, Glasbergen
et al. 2007, Holder and Flessas 2008, Ostrom et al.
1999, Rosenau 1992). Examples include the regulation
of the global spectrum in wireless telecommunications
and the Montreal Protocol for protecting the ozone layer
(Krasner 1991).
An institutional lens on transnational commons allows
us to understand the emergence of a commons as a social
construction process in which key actors in a transna-
tional field may eventually reach large-scale convergence
around a “transnational commons logic.” Conceptualiz-
ing these commons as socially constructed (Pettenger
2007) allows us to go beyond essentialist economic
accounts to address unanswered questions about how
affected actors can agree on and implement institutional
rules and practices and discover mechanisms by which
institutional agreements emerge and evolve in such con-
flicted and unwieldy contexts (Davis and Marquis 2005,
Rao and Appadurai 2008). Consistent with notions of
institutional logics (Thornton and Ocasio 2008), we con-
tend that the construction of a transnational commons
logic involves both cognitive and symbolic elements
(to identify a problem) and the adoption of material prac-
tices (to address a problem). We pose three research
questions that advance this institutional perspective on
commons: (1) What conditions are necessary for a
transnational commons logic to emerge within a field?
(2) What mechanisms induce actors with conflicting log-
ics to change their frames regarding contentious issues?
(3) How do changes in actor-level frames lead to the
emergence of a field-level transnational commons logic?
To answer these questions, we carried out an induc-
tive case study to track the evolution of the climate
change field. Changes in climate are widely believed to
have resulted from emissions associated with industrial-
ization, urbanization, increased mobility, and deforesta-
tion (Härtel and Pearman 2010). Because the atmosphere
cannot be partitioned into privately held territories and
the actions of actors may harm or benefit others, climate
change represents a formidable transnational challenge
(Depledge 2005, Mann and Kump 2008). Successfully
averting tragedy with respect to climate change requires
the cooperation of some 200 sovereign nation-states and
numerous corporate and civic actors to view it as a
shared concern and develop transnational solutions. The
field is, however, fraught with controversy, not only
about solutions to apportion responsibility for reduc-
ing emissions among different public and private actors
but, more fundamentally still, about whether climate
change is even a scientific certainty that warrants insti-
tutional attention and governance. Thus, perceptions that
a commons problem exists in this space and that global
mitigation efforts are needed have evolved slowly and
remained contested.
Our analysis makes four contributions to understand-
ing institutional processes by which commons evolve
in transnational fields. First, in contrast to conventional
economic accounts, which conceptualize actors as cal-
culative and commons as natural, static, and innately
public or private (e.g., Sandler 2004, Wijen and Ansari
2007), we reconceptualize the commons as a socially
constructed hybrid logic, the meaning of which is subject
to change as field-level frames gain and lose ascen-
dency over time. Second, our analysis reveals three con-
ditions necessary for a commons logic to emerge within
a field. Third, abstracting from our data on climate
change over a 40-year period, we identify several pro-
cess mechanisms that provoke actors with conflicting
logics to change their frames to foster the gradual emer-
gence of a commons logic. Fourth, we demonstrate how
frame shifts among actors guided by different institu-
tional logics may cumulate into nonlinear frame shifts
at the field level, eventually enabling the emergence of
a commons logic.
In the remainder of this paper, we first define transna-
tional commons. Next, we review and critique economic
theories of transnational commons and develop a the-
ory of how commons are socially constructed. Then we
describe our method and report and discuss our findings.
We conclude with implications for the emergence of a
transnational commons logic in institutional fields.
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Theorizing Transnational Commons
By institutions, we refer to “those collective frames and
systems that provide stability and meaning to social
behavior and social interaction and take on a rule-
like status in social thought and action” (Djelic and
Quack 2008, p. 300; see also Douglas 1986, pp. 46–48).
Transnational fields, like other institutional fields, are
richly contextualized spaces of potentially contested
social positions that form around issues, where com-
peting interests negotiate over issue interpretation and
often build new linkages (Hoffman 1999, Martin 2003).
For example, a field that forms around protecting the
natural environment joins actors with disparate views
(e.g., environmentalists and chemical manufacturers),
who then occupy a common space to exert mutual
influence (Hoffman 1999). In such fields, “struggles
between different parties and a fair degree of institutions
in the making are to be expected” (Djelic and Quack
2008, p. 303). Three types of transnational institutions
can emerge: standards, regimes, and meta-organizations.
Standards are “explicit, almost always written, state-
ments that prescribe how certain actors must behave in
certain situations” (Ahrne and Brunsson 2006, p. 82).
Regimes are collections of nation-states that develop
explicit protocols or rules for governance (e.g., the Mon-
treal Protocol) (Young 1994). Meta-organizations (e.g.,
UNESCO) are voluntary associations of public and pri-
vate organizations.
The development of transnational institutions involves
the participation of diverse social actors at multiple lev-
els (Djelic and Quack 2008, Wooten and Hoffman 2008).
We use the term social actors broadly, as do Coleman
(1974), Scott (1995), and Misangyi et al. (2008), to refer
to persons (e.g., individual diplomats and scientists) or
collectives of actors such as firms, NGOs, and nation-
states. Widespread agreement about whether a field is
a commons is unlikely initially because its boundaries
and membership are frequently contested during its for-
mative or transformational period (Garud 2008). Yet,
unlike in other fields, institutional processes in transna-
tional fields run through vertically layered institutional
orders that span national borders without an overarching
authority to enforce the rules of the game. An increas-
ing number of transnational issues involve social actors
from diverse countries operating at multiple levels (local,
regional, and global) to create new institutional norms
and an effective governance structure for the field (Djelic
and Quack 2008).
Transnational commons may be tangible, such as
oceans, or intangible, like the Internet. Two critical fea-
tures of transnational commons stand out. First, in con-
ceptualizing a transnational commons, actors “engage
overlapping spatial and territorial formations, create
overlaps between communities and interests, between
states and communities” (Rao and Appadurai 2008,
p. 162), and between other actors such as MNCs and
NGOs. Second, a transnational commons is character-
ized by the absence of an overarching authority or
legal structure that generates processes to define and
resolve the problems that stretch across boundaries. Con-
sequently, institutionalization around transnational com-
mons requires cooperation under anarchy (Axelrod 1984,
Rosenau 1992)—no easy task given the inherent disin-
centives for collective action. We now briefly review the
prominent economic arguments about commons gover-
nance and then introduce an institutional conceptualiza-
tion, based on the premise that commons are socially
constructed phenomena.
Economic Accounts of Commons
Conventional economic arguments about commons,
premised on rational choice and methodological indi-
vidualism, conceptualize commons as objectively given,
innate, and naturally bonding a set of actors but also
prone to misuse and underinvestment (Hardin 1968,
Schelling 1978). They assume that people are self-
interested, norm-free, and opportunistic maximizers of
short-term interests who, in the absence of rules limiting
access and defining rights and duties, typically neglect
the long-term interests of the collectivity (Blomley
2008). These traditional models of commons, such as
Hardin’s (1968) tragedy of the commons and Olson’s
(1965) logic of collective action, argue that several
“classic” restraining forces preclude the possibility of
devising an institutional means of voluntarily regulat-
ing commons. Economists argue that these forces make
the “costs” of participation seem higher than the “ben-
efits” of nonparticipation. Without coercive structures
to induce participation, actors will shun cooperation,
increasing the possibility of tragic outcomes.
Economic models identify several processes that
heighten the likelihood of tragic outcomes. The best
known is free riding, where some actors enjoy benefits
accruing from collective effort but contribute little
or nothing to the effort (Olson 1965). Alternatively,
bystander apathy (i.e., avoiding action because of the
availability of others to respond; see Darley and Latané
1968), conflicting interests (Levy and Egan 2003), and
the lack of capabilities (Levy et al. 1993) can all
block joint action. Without an external authority, these
restraining forces can lead to suboptimal outcomes
such as field-level stasis or, worse, the degradation of
resources. Field-level prevention of such a “tragedy”
then requires either enclosing the commons by delegat-
ing commons rights to a government with powers of
enforcement or allocating property rights through priva-
tization (Hardin 1998).
Despite its influence, the conventional economic ap-
proach leaves unanswered questions about why massive
collective action, large-scale consensus, and gover-
nance initiatives with respect to commons problems
have emerged in transnational arenas (Engels 2006,
Ansari, Wijen, and Gray: An Institutional Perspective on the “Tragedy of the Commons”
Organization Science 24(4), pp. 1014–1040, © 2013 INFORMS 1017
Glasbergen et al. 2007). More recent accounts have
suggested self-regulation (Hoffman 1999) or communal
solutions to commons, which allocate rights of access
and use to an interdependent community of users who
identify with one another and draw on trust, reciprocity,
and reputation to locally craft norms that limit mis-
use (Ostrom 1990). However, these accounts continue to
conceptualize commons as innate and natural, and few
of them address transnational issues. Additionally, they
fail to identify the mechanisms through which conflict-
ing frames about the problem are reconciled, and con-
sensus about an emerging logic becomes increasingly
institutionalized.
An Institutional Perspective on Commons
Social Construction. In contrast to economic argu-
ments, institutional theory can explain how large-scale
consensus can emerge to govern transnational com-
mons when an effective overarching authority is absent.
Building on Berger and Luckman’s (1968) notion of a
socially constructed reality, institutional scholars argue
that transnational commons are not predetermined but
socially constructed phenomena, in which institutional
norms and practices, rather than individualized ratio-
nal choices, motivate actors’ behavior (Fehr and Gintis
2007). Social problems do not exist in any objective
sense but rather are “named” as a result of the collective
practices that create meaning for them (Blumer 1971).
Consequently, categorical distinctions (such as public
versus private or collective versus individual) are not
natural or essential, but are instead socially produced,
varying with respect to time and location and chang-
ing as fields evolve (Holm 1995, Leblebici et al. 1991).
For example, in studying the origins of art museums,
DiMaggio (1991) explained how the idea that art is a
public commodity came to replace the notion that art
belongs only to privileged patrons.
We contend that this same social construction pro-
cess applies to the notion of commons. A commons
is socially constructed when actors develop a collec-
tive awareness that both a problem and a solution to it
exist. What is deemed a commons is historically con-
tingent and emerges gradually as norms and practices
become institutionalized in a field. A critical moment
in the social construction of a commons occurs when
an environmental or social resource comes to be defined
as vulnerable (e.g., scarce and finite), which then has
implications for the subsequent direction of a field. For
example, conceptions of oceans shifted over time—from
an unlimited resource to an unclaimable transport sur-
face, then to a claimable resource space, and finally to a
field for military adventure—as political and economic
structures shifted (Steinberg 2001). These shifts repro-
duced the ocean as a uniquely constructed space with
a complex regime designed to serve a multiplicity of
functions.
Rao and Appadurai (2008, p. 163) argued that “the
question of what measures should be taken to protect
or otherwise manage common resources are determined
in part by the definitional frameworks that determine
what counts as the ‘common.’ ” Through the process of
developing and specifying the scope, significance, and
relative vulnerability of a resource, actors participate in
socially constructing a commons and then, depending
on the degree of consensus about their underlying logics
and degree of urgency, may or may not initiate collec-
tive action to decide how the resource will be allocated
or protected. Based on the discussion above, we assert
that socially constructing a field as a commons involves
adopting an overarching logic about the nature of the
field—a commons logic.
Conflicting Logics. A core tenet of a socially con-
structed conceptualization of commons is the idea that
actors’ frames, identities, and actions are shaped by
institutional logics, which provide “individuals and orga-
nizations with a set of rules and conventions—for decid-
ing which problems get attended to, which solutions
get considered and which solutions get linked to which
situations” (Thornton and Ocasio 2008, p. 114). Core
logics include market, corporation, profession, state,
family, religion, and community (Thornton et al. 2012).
To understand whether and how social actors within
a field converge around a commons logic, we need
to consider the dominant logics of each of the field’s
social actors. Because actors’ interests do not develop
in a sociocultural vacuum (Wejnert 2002), their indi-
vidual frames (Benford and Snow 2000, Gray 2003)
about field-level issues and their preferred actions for a
field must be understood in terms of the dominant log-
ics in the wider societal contexts in which they operate
(Djelic and Quack 2008) and attempt to realize their
interests. However, because transnational actors at multi-
ple levels are subject to different institutional pressures,
their logics and frames are likely to diverge substantially
as they draw on widely different “cultural narratives
and repertoires at hand” (Emirbayer and Mische 1998,
p. 993) to develop their interpretations, theorizations,
and representations of whether they share a common
fate, whether their behavior contributes to the problem,
and how the field ought to be governed. Therefore, actors
in transnational fields may be guided by (variants of)
different logics, drawn from the societal level (Friedland
and Alford 1991), the field level (Thornton and Ocasio
1999), and/or the organizational level (Battilana and
Dorado 2010), depending on the contexts in which they
are embedded. Consequently, no institutional order with
its accompanying logics is “accorded causal primacy a
priori” (Thornton and Ocasio 2008, p. 104) in a trans-
national field.
To theorize about commons construction, it is neces-
sary to understand the different and often conflicting log-
ics that actors employ to ensure “order and ontological
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security” as well as how logics induce actors to frame
problems differently and to advocate particular actions
over others (Thornton and Ocasio 2008, p. 108; Purdy
and Gray 2009). Identifying the diverse logics within a
field lays the basis for a richer and more dynamic under-
standing of the differential capacity that actors have to
mediate the structuring of contexts within which action
unfolds. For new institutional arrangements to emerge,
actors guided by different logics need to “build upon,
work around, recombine, reinvent and reinterpret log-
ics and institutional arrangements” (Djelic and Quack
2008, p. 308).
Frames and Frame Shifts. Whereas different (con-
flicting) logics in a field can coexist (Purdy and Gray
2009, Reay and Hinings 2009, Seo and Creed 2002),
they may also blend (Glynn and Lounsbury 2005, Rao
and Giorgi 2006), hybridize (Haveman and Rao 1997,
Mars and Lounsbury 2009), or recombine (Djelic and
Quack 2008). Such changes do not result from “acciden-
tal encounters” of diverse logics; instead, they usually
involve deliberate attempts to persuade other actors to
change their frames. By rendering events or occurrences
meaningful, “frames function to organize experience and
guide action, whether individual or collective” (Snow
et al. 1986, p. 464). Because logics are manifested both
in substantive behavioral actions and in actors’ use of
frames, reframing occurs through theorization of abstract
models and representations as well as concrete behav-
ioral manifestations and actions (Benford and Snow
2000, Nigam and Ocasio 2010).
Framing can also function as a rhetorical device
through which actors create specific meaning in line with
political interests (Fiss and Hirsch 2005, Suddaby and
Greenwood 2005). For example, social movement theo-
rists have argued how leaders attract adherents through
frames that diagnose problems and assign blame, prog-
nostic frames that lay out remedial actions, and motiva-
tional frames that provide rationales for action (Benford
and Snow 2000). In contested institutional fields, frame
analysis is a particularly useful tool for analyzing
how field-level actors engage in discursive struggles to
advance their respective logics and practices (Creed et al.
2002, Kaplan 2008, Elliott et al. 2003, Rydin 2003).
Engagement among actors within a transnational field
affords them opportunities for cognitive realignment and
transformation of frames grounded in exemplars of those
practices, as Nigam and Ocasio (2010) showed in the
context of US healthcare.
Transnational fields are likely to be characterized
by a “polysemy of frame repertoires” (Kaplan 2008,
p. 746). As these fields evolve, the potential exists
for field-level frames to emerge and diffuse if actors
with divergent frames can reconcile their frame differ-
ences. Field frames emerge when the divergent frames
of actors in a field converge around a shared frame
(Kaplan 2008, Lounsbury et al. 2003). Little attention
has been given to what process mechanisms underlie
shifts in actors’ frames to enable consensus around field
frames. Although the identification of mechanisms that
enable field-level change has been argued to be criti-
cal for advancing theorization about institutions (Davis
and Marquis 2005, Dobbin et al. 2007, Schneiberg and
Clemens 2006), there is little consensus among schol-
ars about what exactly constitutes a social mechanism
and hardly any theorization about what mechanisms
might enable actors to shift their frames on a trans-
national issue.
Multilevel Field Dynamics. To understand field
changes, it is important to analyze the ways in which
frames shift and disseminate in a field, and, conse-
quently, a new logic may emerge. However, how a new
logic emerges in transnational fields is not well under-
stood. At the field level, researchers studying social
problems (e.g., Best 2001) have proposed diffusion mod-
els drawing both on economic (e.g., Banerjee 1992) and
sociological (e.g., Strang and Soule 1998) arguments to
explain how social problems and claims are constructed
and how they are adapted as they diffuse across time
and space (Ansari et al. 2010). At the transnational level,
Djelic and Quack (2008) suggested that more emergent
modes of diffusion may operate with less predictable
results. Drawing on these and related arguments (Purdy
and Gray 2009, Sewell 1996), we question whether
extant diffusion models sufficiently capture the complex
dynamics at work in transnational fields (Watts 2003),
where shifts in frames by actors at one level have wider,
field-level repercussions (Tarrow 2005).
To sum, although institutional theory offers useful
constructs for exploring transnational commons, (i.e.,
social construction, conflicting logics, and different level
frame shifts), further research is needed to identify
what constitutes a commons logic and what mechanisms
induce actors with conflicting logics to change frames
enough to reach a working consensus and promote the
construction of a commons logic in a transnational
field. We explore those questions in the field of climate
change.
Methodology
Our data collection and analytic approach exempli-
fies what has been termed “historical process research”
(Langley 1999, Pentland 1999, Van de Ven and Poole
2002). Process research does not focus on variance, but
rather emphasizes the understanding of how and why
“discrete events and states” (Elsbach and Sutton 1992,
p. 708) evolve over time. Data for process research
consist of events, activities, and choices ordered over
time (Langley 1999). Studying processes can result in
an articulation of routines and practices that remain
relatively constant over time or of diachronic changes
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that emerge chronologically across time (Barley 1990).
To show how the field of climate change came to be
widely considered a commons, we needed a diachronic
approach to track the evolution of the field over time and
the development of consensus around a commons logic.
Setting and Data Collection
Given the scope of our topic and the volume of poten-
tial data we could gather, we needed to bound signif-
icantly. By perusing historical overviews of actors and
events prior to the Kyoto Protocol (e.g., Grubb et al.
1999) and holding discussions with an expert who had
been involved in climate policy negotiations during this
period, we identified key actors in the field of cli-
mate change: science (Intergovernmental Panel on Cli-
mate Change (IPCC)), government (the European Union
(EU), the US, and the Group of 77 (G-77), representing
developing countries), business (corporations and trade
associations), and civil society (transnational NGOs).
In 2003, 24 interviews were held with 21 representa-
tives of these actors (4 from science, 12 from govern-
ment, 3 from business, and 2 from civil society), as
well as 8 external experts (social scientists) who had
observed the evolution of the climate field over time.
These interviews lasted 30 to 90 minutes, with an aver-
age of 60 minutes, and produced 206 pages of tran-
scripts. Interviewees were asked to chart the positions
of key actors in the emerging field of global climate
change, the rationales accounting for these positions, and
how and why key actors had changed their viewpoints.
In parallel, we collected secondary data to trace new
developments. We used key terms (such as climate
change, climate policy, and global warming) to gather
290 articles in which climate change was the main topic
from leading newspapers, mass media publications, and
the Web for the period 2003–2010. These publications
dealt with (changes in) the positions of key actors, the
unfolding of climate negotiations, the status of climate
agreements, and the science of climate change. We also
perused a rapidly expanding (academic) literature on
climate change. One author attended the Copenhagen
Climate Summit (COP-15) in 2009 and collected 70 doc-
uments and digital repositories. Finally, we conducted
seven targeted conversations in 2010–2011 with key
informants to refine our understanding of actors’ frame
shifts. Overall, we created a fairly comprehensive set of
data from which to identify and triangulate our findings
about the key actors’ logics and frames and the points
at which, and reasons why, these frames shifted.
Analytic Strategy
The first step in our historical research process approach
was the chronological identification of major histori-
cal events that marked the evolution of the debate in
the field. We began with scientific attention to climate
change as an issue of global concern in 1969 and ended
with the Cancún Agreement in 2010. This produced a
total of 13 historical events.
After demarcating the array of key historical events,
in our second step, we began to examine which of these
were field-configuring events—that is, those events that
provided impetus for change within the institutional field
(Hardy and Maguire 2010). According to Sewell (1996,
p. 844), such an event is “(1) a ramified sequence of
occurrences that (2) is recognized as notable by contem-
poraries, and that (3) results in a durable transformation
of structures.” To do this, we initially charted the frames
and underlying logics of key actors during the focal
period, and we assessed the extent to which these actors
shifted their frames before, during, or after the histori-
cal events we had identified. We drew on the framework
of Thornton et al. (2012) to classify actors’ core logics.
Four of them were evident in our data: the state logic
(embraced by several national governments and NGOs),
the professional logic (associated with science), the mar-
ket logic (upheld by businesses and certain national
governments), and the community logic (embraced by
NGOs and some national governments).1 To identify the
episodes when actors shifted their frames, we looked
for what have been referred to as “discursive shifts”
(Maguire and Hardy 2009) or “ ‘breaches’ that reveal
the usually undiscussed boundaries of taken-for-granted
understandings” (Schneiberg and Clemens 2006, p. 214).
This step resulted in the identification of 12 actor-level
frame shifts.
Our third step was to search for underlying factors
that induced actors to change frames in each of the
12 frame shifts identified above. We looked for evidence
indicating if, how, and why different actors’ frames and
actions were either driving or driven by field-configuring
events or by other actors’ responses to these events. This
required analyzing how frames and actions at one level
affected those at other levels. We coded each frame shift
for features that exemplified extant mechanisms in the
literature, new ones, or variants of existing ones. This
iterative process generated nine provisional mechanisms.
By comparing the mechanism(s) for each frame shift,
we realized commonalities among some of the mech-
anisms and collapsed the nine into five, more generic,
mechanisms that prompted frame changes. Each cate-
gory contained factors that were similar to other factors
in that category yet distinct from those in other cate-
gories, thereby ensuring that each category showed both
convergent and discriminant validity (Drucker-Godard
et al. 1999). The resultant “mechanisms” (Davis and
Marquis 2005) or “process drivers” (Langley 1999,
p. 904) reside at a level of analysis above description and
below universal laws, and they serve as theoretical expla-
nations for change in institutional fields (Dobbin et al.
2007). The mechanisms reflect the exercise of individ-
ual agency in generating frame shifts as well as cultur-
ally mediated responses provoked by certain situations
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or in response to the actions of other stakeholders (Gross
2009). We created a label for each mechanism that cap-
tured the essence of the underlying explanation.
Our fourth step was to look more globally at the emer-
gence of field frames (Lounsbury et al. 2003) arising
from changes in actors’ frames over time. Because we
were interested in whether a commons was being con-
structed at the field level, we looked for evidence of
how an initial frame advanced by one actor was rein-
forced when other actors also adopted it—that is, to what
extent and at what point in time actors’ frames about
climate change began to converge at the field level. For
this, we used a “temporal bracketing” approach (Langley
1999) to impose rough historical frameworks on the
data. As Langley (1999) noted, the phases that result
from temporal bracketing do not represent a predictable
sequential process. Instead, these event data show non-
recurrent types of change (Abbott 1990)—in our case,
whether and to what extent consensus was emerging
over time. Because events and the altering of institu-
tional arrangements are recursively related (Hoffman and
Ocasio 2001), we demarcated the end of a phase with
the occurrence of a discontinuity with the past. Temporal
bracketing enabled us to demarcate generic differences
in the nature of the climate debate for each brack-
eted period (as certain frames gained saliency, others
receded in interest, and still others appeared for the first
time) and to relate actor-level frame shifts to field-level
changes.
Our fifth step was to array these field frame shifts in
temporal order and examine their interrelations. From
this analysis, three conditions emerged that capture the
bases of an emerging consensus among actors about the
climate change field as a commons: the view that their
fates were interconnected, the acceptance of responsi-
bility by all, and the need to take collective action. For
each of these conditions, a cluster of actors (although
not necessarily all) displayed similar framing.
Finally, we considered whether the mechanisms we
identified in the third step could be linked to the three
conditions necessary for a commons logic to emerge.
Figure 1 Historical Events in the Field of Climate Change
1979 20091988 1992 1995 1997 2005 200719901987 2010
First World Climate Conference
Brundtland Report
Signing of Montreal Protocol
Creation of IPCC
IPCC’s First Assessment Report
Adoption of UNFCCC
IPCC’s Second Assessment Report
Signing of Kyoto Protocol
Launch of EU emissions-trading scheme
Entry into force
of Kyoto Protocol
Bali Roadmap
Copenhagen Accord
Cancún Agreement
This resulted in a process model that explains how
consensus develops around a transnational commons
logic. For ease of presentation, we organize our findings
around each phase.
Findings
Our empirical findings are structured by phase. The first
period starts with early attention to climate change by
the scientific community and ends in 1991, just before
the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro. The second time
phase begins with the 1992 Rio Conference and ends
with the passage of the Kyoto Protocol in 1997. The
final phase follows events from 1998 to 2010, when the
Cancún Agreement was adopted. Figure 1 presents a
chronology of major historical events across all three
phases. For each phase, we organize our findings around
the main events and key field frame(s) that emerged in
that phase and the underlying actor-level shifts that gave
rise to them (first-order analysis). We then introduce a
model of the mechanisms associated with these shifts
and show how they support the development of a com-
mons logic over time in the field of climate change (our
second-order analysis).
Historical Background of the Climate Change Field
Phase I: The Early Phase (1969–1991). Over the past
century, climate scientists have noted that the average
temperature of the Earth has risen significantly (Inter-
governmental Panel on Climate Change 2007). This
change, attributed to an increased release of largely
imperceptible “greenhouse gases,” is argued to have far-
reaching consequences, ranging from the melting of ice
caps and the increased occurrence of flooding for some
locales, to desertification for others, and to the loss of
biodiversity worldwide. Although the idea that humans
can change the climate dates back to 1827 (Grubb et al.
1999), nations began to worry about climate change only
from the 1950s onward, and then only as a national secu-
rity issue (e.g., desertification would cause widespread
migration) that would require militaristic interventions to
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ensure peace (Finger 2008, Pettenger 2007). In the US,
fallout from atmospheric nuclear testing in the 1950s
also elevated the legitimacy of the idea that humans had
to the potential to “trample” on Mother Earth and change
the climate (Hart and Victor 1993). By the late 1960s,
when our analysis begins, climate change research from
several disparate streams (Hart and Victor 1993) was
organized into a more coordinated, policy-oriented body
of work (Demeritt 2001), and the issue moved from the
restricted purview of a select group of scientists to make
its debut on the transnational policy stage.
Field Frame 1: Viewing climate change as an anthro-
pogenic, transnational problem. The first emergent field
frame we identified was the growing agreement that cli-
mate change was an anthropogenic problem occurring
at the transnational level. Two actor-level frame shifts
(1a and 1b), initiated by elite scientists, NGOs, the US
national government, and supranational organizations,
could be seen as contributing to the development of this
field frame.
Frame Shift 1a: The atmosphere is recast from a
dump to a fragile and vulnerable space. Growing con-
sensus among elite scientists about the atmosphere’s
vulnerability reflects the first major actor-level frame
shift our data revealed. Prior to 1970, the narrow focus
of research on weather and the atmosphere (e.g., on
atmospheric modeling, carbon cycles, oceanography, and
rainmaking) was siloed in different institutions with dif-
ferent funding sources (Hart and Victor 1993). However,
from 1969 onward, several developments highlighted
the necessity of a broader view linking these research
streams. First, key institutional entrepreneurs2 within
science and policymaking (including Robert Wilson
at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
and leaders of the World Meteorological Organization
(WMO) and the United Nations (UN) Environment Pro-
gram) began to frame climate change as a scientific
issue of global concern.3 European and North American
NGOs also contributed toward initiating this frame
through launching a worldwide environmental move-
ment to limit damage from the “treadmill of production”
(Schnaiberg 1980, quoted by Rudel et al. 2011, p. 11.2)
that gave rise to environmentalism as an “institution”
in its own right (Frank et al. 2000). International actors
such as the UN and WMO reinforced this frame by con-
vening conferences that stressed the potential effects of
climate change on humanity (the UN Conference on the
Human Environment (UNCHE) or the Stockholm Con-
ference in 1972 and the First World Climate Conference
in 1979, respectively). Several historical events played
a role in this shift. Extreme weather-related anoma-
lies in the early 1970s (e.g., drought in the Soviet
Union and unseasonably cold winters in the US) boosted
the urgency to attend to climate change and prompted
another elite entrepreneur, US Secretary of State Henry
Kissinger, to champion an increase in funding for cli-
mate change research in 1974 (Hart and Victor 1993).
Throughout the 1980s, rising carbon dioxide levels in the
atmosphere because of increasing discharge of automo-
bile and jet engine exhausts and burning rubbish heaps
were increasingly touted as a threat to climate stabil-
ity. Other events include the successful 1987 Montreal
Protocol on the global phasing out of ozone-depleting
gases (Barrett 2003) and the ascendancy of the notion of
sustainable development (popularized through the 1987
Brundtland Report) to simultaneously achieve economic
development, environmental health, and social justice.
Leveraging all these events (cf. Munir 2005), atmo-
spheric scientists began to reconstruct the greenhouse
effect as a clear threat and to define anthropogenic cli-
mate change as a transnational environmental issue that
needed human intervention. Thus, between 1979 and
1991, the idea that science, operating under a profes-
sional logic, is the only “authority” that stands above
and outside the fray as a uniquely privileged vehicle to
what is true, objective, and hence undeniable (Demeritt
2001) gained ground and led the way for the emer-
gence of scientific consensus on climate change (Uri and
Bearman 2010).
Frame Shift 1b: Climate change goes from being
a national issue to a transnational issue. In 1988, the
perceived need among elite scientists and nation-states
to establish an objective basis for climate policy materi-
alized in the formation of the IPCC (a joint effort of the
WMO and the UN). Although some skepticism among
scientists remained at this time (McCright and Dunlap
2000), the IPCC, in its 1990 First Assessment Report,
furthered the appreciation that humans were intercon-
nected by invisible, potentially human-induced changes
in the atmosphere’s composition, thereby advancing the
notion that the atmosphere is a transnational commons
that needs to be governed. The UNCHE Conference,
among others, established the basis for “soft law” or
nonbinding agreements (Sands and Peel 2005), assert-
ing that nation-states bear responsibility for transna-
tional environmental protection—thereby limiting their
sovereign rights when it came to environmental degra-
dation. Amid increasing influence of transnational orga-
nizations, such as the International Monetary Fund and
World Bank, some countries began to realize that strate-
gies beyond a focus on national territorial defense and
conquest were needed to address an issue in which their
fates were interconnected. Climate change became not
just an anthropogenic but also a transnational problem.
Phase II: The Pre-Kyoto Phase (1992–1997). Spurred
by the IPCC’s initial report as well as general con-
cerns about the environment, political leaders of 188
countries worked to construct the UN Framework Con-
vention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), signed at the
1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro. Key elements
included the precautionary principle (i.e., action should
be taken despite scientific uncertainty), acknowledgment
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of “common but differentiated responsibilities” for
industrialized and developing nation-states, a vague
notion of “equity,” and expectations about returning to
1990 greenhouse gas emission levels (Grubb et al. 1999).
The UNFCCC represents the first transnational effort
to regulate emissions and marks a shift from a previ-
ous view of unbridled economic growth to sustainable
growth, resting on the assumptions that the atmosphere
is fragile and has limited capacity to absorb greenhouse
gases without significant temperature increases and envi-
ronmental degradation (Oberthür and Ott 1999).
By 1992, an increasing number of actors with diver-
gent perspectives had become involved in international
deliberations about climate change. Although there was
a strong level of agreement among governments about
the need for ameliorative action to stabilize emissions,
not all actors subscribed to the idea that their fates were
interconnected or that their actions contributed to climate
change.
Table 1 charts the key actors as well as their log-
ics, frames, and allies in the early to mid-1990s,
including whether and how these subsequently changed.
Some actors—the 15 member states of the EU, the
Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS; most threat-
ened by climate change), and NGOs—embraced an
environmentally oriented community logic, arguing that
we share one planet with constrained resources, and
a state logic, advocating for a regulatory frame with
top-down policies and measures. However, another
group of developed countries—including Japan, the US,
Table 1 Key Actor Logics, Frames, and Allies
Key actor Underlying logic Framing (mid-1990s) Alignment with other actors
EU (15 member states,
including the United
Kingdom)
State
Community (environmental)
Top-down regulation with targets and
timetables
Polluter pays
G-77; environmental NGOs
JUSSCANNZ (Japan,
the US, Switzerland,
Canada, Australia,
Norway, and
New Zealand)
Market Only voluntary measures to avoid
adverse economic impacts
OPEC; Global Climate Coalition
G-77
(developing countries,
including China, OPEC,
and AOSIS)
Community (environmental
and equity)
State
Market
Overall: Justice (only historical polluters
to pay)
AOSIS: Targets for and regulation of
polluters to warrant survival
OPEC: No regulation to avoid loss of
income
Overall: EU; environmental NGOs
OPEC: JUSSCANNZ; Global
Climate Coalition
IPCC Profession Further research is needed to assess
the exact relations between human
behavior and climate change
Environmental NGOs; G-77; EU
Environmental NGOs
(including Greenpeace,
united in Climate Action
Network)
Community (environmental)
State
Crisis as a result of human-induced
climate change
Top-down regulation with targets and
timetables for industrialized countries
EU; IPCC
Global Climate Coalition
(including British
Petroleum)
Market Only voluntary measures and
questioning of climate change
science (a hoax)
JUSSCANNZ; OPEC
Switzerland, Canada, Australia, Norway, and New
Zealand—(eventually) joined forces in the JUSSCANNZ
group to strongly oppose mandatory commitments and
embrace what they viewed as cost-effective, voluntary,
market-based initiatives. Next to these two camps was
the G-77, a very diverse group of over 100 develop-
ing countries that were united by their determination
that only industrialized countries, historically account-
able for the lion’s share of global emissions, should
take action. The G-77 embraced aspects of a community
logic that stresses reciprocity, as was evident in their
argument that they were entitled to their “fair share”
of the world’s natural resources. Advancing an equity
frame, they claimed that only historical polluters should
be subject to mandatory regulations. However, the oil
and gas producing countries of the G-77—backed by the
Global Climate Coalition (GCC), a group of oil and gas
producing companies—feared that restrictive measures
would jeopardize their future income. Embracing a mar-
ket logic and framing climate change as a hoax, they
fiercely opposed such restrictive regulations. Although
the different key actors had diverse logics and frames,
they realized that coalitions with other major players
were important to achieve a critical mass and bend any
transnational agreement in their favor. Thus, the EU
heavily relied on the IPCC’s findings and largely sided
with the non–Organization of the Petroleum Export-
ing Countries (OPEC) G-77 members and environmen-
tal NGOs. The JUSSCANNZ group joined forces with
OPEC countries and the GCC.
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Field Frame 2: Accepting binding targets for histor-
ical polluters. As we noted above, not all actors saw
the need to limit emissions or otherwise address climate
change. However, in the run-up to the Kyoto Protocol,
key players began to agree that emission caps for histori-
cal polluters were needed. The IPCC’s (1995, p. 10) Sec-
ond Assessment Report, which stated that “the balance
of evidence suggests a discernible human influence on
global climate,” served as a trigger for two reinforcing
actor-level frame shifts that contributed to the emergence
of the field frame on emissions caps. Also in 1995, dis-
satisfied with the elusive nature of the Rio commitments,
national delegates to the first Conference of the Parties
(COP) started negotiating a comprehensive global cli-
mate agreement, in which the AOSIS delegation pushed
for binding emission targets for industrialized countries.
Frame Shift 2a: The US evolves from pursuing vol-
untary measures to binding emission-reduction targets.
Initially, the US strongly preferred pursuing voluntary
emission-reduction measures only. It opposed any bind-
ing regulations that would curtail civic freedom or harm
business or the US economy. Against the backdrop of the
AOSIS proposal and the IPCC report, in 1996, the US
formally proposed quantified national emission targets
while holding on to the inclusion of market mechanisms
(Grubb et al. 1999). The US concession was imperative
to the conclusion of the Kyoto Protocol.
Frame Shift 2b: The EU moves from top-down reg-
ulation only to regulation and binding targets. When
binding emission targets were formally on the table, the
EU readily embraced them as a way to seriously com-
mit industrialized countries to mitigation efforts. While
accepting the principle of binding targets, the EU also
kept insisting on top-down government regulation in the
run-up to Kyoto (Grubb et al. 1999). The EU’s endorse-
ment of binding targets reinforced the support of the
field frame that countries with historical responsibility
for climate change were bound by emission caps.
Field Frame 3: Viewing global carbon markets as
acceptable mitigation instruments. The third unfold-
ing field frame involved overcoming resistance to
the principle of using market instruments for climate
change mitigation. These three key interpretive shifts,
all related to the Kyoto negotiations, occurred and con-
tributed to the growing acceptance of market principles
to mitigate climate change. After protracted negotia-
tions, both the polluter-pays frame and the ecological
modernization frame, which advocates “compatibility
between economic growth and environmental protec-
tion” (Bäckstrand and Lövbrand 2007, p. 129), became
cornerstones of the ensuing Kyoto Protocol, signed at
COP-3 in 1997 and ratified in 2005 by 188 countries,
including China but excluding the US (UN Framework
Convention on Climate Change 2009). The protocol,
requiring an average 5.2% reduction in greenhouse gas
emissions by developed countries below 1990 levels
by 2008–2012, allows for the introduction of flexi-
ble mechanisms favored by several developed coun-
tries and exempts the G-77 nations from emission
reduction targets (Grubb et al. 1999). The flexible
mechanisms included emissions trading, joint implemen-
tation (JI; involving foreign projects among industrial-
ized countries), and the clean development mechanism
(CDM; a project-based financing mechanism in which
industrialized countries could comply with their emis-
sion reduction commitments in developing countries).
Frame Shifts 3a, 3b, and 3c: G-77, EU, and Green-
peace go from being regulation advocates to market
endorsers. An important shift was the unexpected
change in framing of the G-77, which led to its mem-
bers’ acquiescence to the Kyoto Protocol. The G-77
was designed to promote the collective economic inter-
ests of developing countries and to increase their joint
negotiating capacity in the UN. Staunchly behind the
polluter-pays frame, this coalition had opposed market
mechanisms for being a strategic ploy and an instance
of “carbon colonialism,” where industrialized countries
could use their land as “carbon dumps” to generate emis-
sion credits (“permits to pollute”) and sidestep signif-
icant domestic action for emission reductions (Grubb
et al. 1999). However, a breakthrough emerged during
the pre-Kyoto negotiations, when Brazil proposed the
creation of an adaptation fund for climate-vulnerable
countries that would be financed by charging industri-
alized countries for noncompliance. Linking this pro-
posal with the US demand for binding commitments
from the G-77 led to the adoption of the CDM. Even-
tually, the G-77 also accepted two other flexible market
mechanisms (JI and emissions trading) in return for the
promise of green investments in their countries, enabling
the Kyoto agreement to be forged in 1997—a reversal
that later came to be known as the “Kyoto Surprise”
(Grubb et al. 1999). Chairman Raúl Estrada-Oyuela also
played an influential role in crafting the text to secure
binding commitments, as he ignored several objections
raised by India and China.
Like the developing countries, EU member states had
favored mandatory action and advocated a strong regu-
lative framework to harmonize and coordinate the (envi-
ronmental) policies of different nation-states (Grubb
et al. 1999). Eventually, however, the EU shifted this
frame—abandoning their demand for prescriptive
actions and accepting flexible market instruments in-
stead, while still insisting on the principle of binding
emission caps. The acceptance of market instruments by
the G-77 and the EU cleared a major obstacle to the
conclusion of the Kyoto Protocol.
Not only nation-states but also certain NGOs gave
up their resistance to using markets for mitigation pur-
poses. In the run-up to Kyoto, most environmental
NGOs, including Greenpeace, were strong supporters of
the polluter-pays frame, fearing that that the use of JI
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would exempt rich nations from taking responsibility for
polluting. Greenpeace, for example, rejected US propos-
als for market solutions because they preferred regu-
lations over flexible, market-based solutions to climate
change. Additionally, market mechanisms were seen as
another move by “the carbon club” to stall real action
(Leggett 1999). Nonetheless, despite their push for reg-
ulations, the NGOs were unsuccessful, because all of
the market mechanisms that the US proposed became
cornerstones of the Kyoto Protocol. Once the G-77, orig-
inally a staunch opponent of these mechanisms, came
on board, Greenpeace increasingly became aware of the
handwriting on the wall and agreed to what had been a
distant second choice for them—the idea of using mar-
kets. In one of our interviews, a Greenpeace representa-
tive noted, “The majority of environmental groups were
opposed to flexible mechanisms. This is a battle we lost
in Kyoto. People say that is part of the protocol, so now
we cannot go against that. 0 0 0 There is no point in con-
tinuing to oppose it, because it is there.” Greenpeace’s
shift from top-down regulatory framing to prudent sup-
port for market-based instruments increased the number
of stakeholders who supported market-based mitigation
measures.
Phase III: The Post-Kyoto Phase (1998–2010). Just
after the unanimous adoption of the Kyoto Protocol,
nation-states waited for its entry into force. This required
the adoption by 55% of signatory nations representing
at least 55% of emissions by industrialized countries.
However, when the US rejected the protocol in 2001,
to meet this double-threshold hurdle, it was imperative
that Russia ratify the protocol, which did not occur until
2004. Whereas many nation-states remained relatively
passive during this uncertain period, several other actors
changed their frames regarding the adoption of mitiga-
tion actions.
Field Frame 4: Implementing carbon market instru-
ments for climate change mitigation. A major field
frame that gained currency after the adoption of the
Kyoto Protocol was the development and implementa-
tion of specific market instruments. Several key actors
shifted their frames, thereby increasing support for the
actual use of markets for mitigating climate change.
Frame Shifts 4a, 4b, and 4c: British Petroleum/
UK/EU move from avoiding/delaying/opposing market-
based mitigation action to adopting emissions trading.
A set of changes occurred between 1997 and 2003 in
a sort of amplifying or domino effect, beginning with
decisions taken by British Petroleum (BP), then the
United Kingdom (UK) government, and ultimately the
EU. Until just before the adoption of the Kyoto Proto-
col, the GCC, representing oil and gas companies and
other major emitters, had opposed emission reduction
measures writ large. However, in a surprise move in
May 1997, BP’s CEO, John Browne, broke ranks with
most other oil-and-gas companies. BP left the GCC and
became the first MNC to commit to emission cuts and
set up an internal carbon-trading market among its divi-
sions (Levy and Kolk 2002). An observer we inter-
viewed attributed this to “the personal influence of John
Browne. It would have been simply irresponsible for him
to look away and, therefore, he decided to break away
from the pack”—a view Browne himself corroborated in
our interview with him. BP’s split from the rest of the
oil-and-gas industry was widely interpreted as a state-
ment of business support for a market approach to green-
house gas mitigation (Pulver 2007) that could preempt
restrictive regulation and as an initiative to strengthen
renewable energy in its overall portfolio. The BP case
has become one of the most widely cited best practices
in corporate climate change initiatives, because BP man-
aged to achieve its 10% reduction goal by 2001 and
claimed to have generated 600 million US dollars in cost
savings (Pinkse and Kolk 2009). Thus, BP framed its
carbon-trading scheme as ecological modernization with
both economic and reputational benefits (Margolick and
Russell 2001).4
Concurrently, the UK engaged in developing national-
level climate change policies. In 1989, the Thatcher
government advocated a framework convention on cli-
mate change. It refused, though, to back specific carbon-
reduction commitments, invoking the need for greater
scientific certainty. The UK’s frame shift was induced by
the convergence of several factors. Next to the country’s
rapid shift from coal to natural gas, the UK government
was also not immune to the actions of some of its largest
MNCs (e.g., BP) and sought their advice in developing
the country’s emissions-trading scheme, which began in
2002 (Kolk and Pinkse 2007). According to one inter-
viewee, “BP was a major high-profile company and its
actions couldn’t have gone unnoticed at the highest level.
The new Labour government, elected in 1997, wanted to
show it was serious about climate change.”
BP’s actions, and subsequently those of the UK, to
develop trading schemes were then pivotal in spurring
the EU—opposed to emissions trading during the Kyoto
negotiations (for fear that it would allow developed
countries to weasel out of their emission reduction
obligations)—to shift its framing of this issue in 2000.
The EU abandoned its top-down regulatory frame and
took preemptive action to thwart the development of a
“patchwork of different national schemes” (Engels 2006,
pp. 341–342) among its member states (such as the UK
and Denmark) by introducing its own scheme in 2005.
With growing experience from various pilot projects, BP
and later Shell became key advisors in the development
of guidelines for the EU’s scheme (Engels 2006). BP’s
frame shift stimulated progressive businesses to assume
responsibility for the commons problem, and the adop-
tion of market-based instruments by BP, the UK, and the
EU constituted important support in the field for using
market instruments to protect the climate commons.
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Field Frame 5: Taking mitigation actions without for-
mal obligations. The final emerging field frame con-
cerns the voluntary commitment to mitigation measures
by actors without formal obligations to do so. This frame
received a significant boost in the field when subnational
actors within the US, a lagging nation-state that had not
ratified the Kyoto Protocol, and major developing coun-
tries, who had signed but were exempt from mitigation
obligations, agreed to take ameliorative actions for mit-
igating climate change.
Frame Shift 5a: US subnational actors evolve
from supporting inaction to ecological modernization.
Despite its early support for the Kyoto agreement, the
US conspicuously lagged behind the EU in commit-
ting to emission reductions (Vogel et al. 2012) and
ultimately refused to ratify the treaty. Given the low-
price energy culture in the US, many US legislators
had viewed mitigation measures as an economic bur-
den (Grubb et al. 1999). In particular, the Republican
Party publicly expressed skepticism about some of the
claims regarding climate change. However, early in the
new millennium, a remarkable bottom-up shift began to
occur in the US, led by several states that broke ranks
with the federal government on the climate change issue.
Foot-dragging by the Bush administration and opposi-
tion to binding mitigation measures by the US Congress
was in stark contrast to the behaviors of many US states,
cities, corporations, universities, and churches. Inspired
by actions in the EU and mass mediatization such as
Al Gore’s documentary An Inconvenient Truth, they vol-
untarily took on relatively ambitious emission-reduction
targets (Vogel et al. 2012). By 2003, the US Environ-
mental Protection Agency (2003) had catalogued over
700 state policies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
By 2006, 28 states had produced climate action plans
(Pew Center on Global Climate 2010). In 2007, joint
commitment evolved into a 10-state, mandatory cap-and-
trade program called the Regional Greenhouse Gas Ini-
tiative. Several US cities also endorsed climate change
programs in 2005, led by the US Mayors Climate Protec-
tion Program and signed by 200 mayors from 38 states.
Several prominent US universities led the Campuses for
Climate Action project, whereas a number of religious
associations (such as the National Council of Churches)
actively campaigned for mitigation measures. Further-
more, chief executives of some of the largest US com-
panies, including General Electric and Walmart, formed
the US Climate Action Partnership in 2005 and launched
high-visibility green branding campaigns, supporting an
emission cut of over 60% by 2050. By advocating and
taking concrete actions for ecological modernization,
these US subnational actors contributed to a discernible
bottom-up shift on climate change in the US.
Frame Shift 5b: BASIC countries go from
being exemption seekers to responsibility accepters.
In the decade following the Kyoto Protocol, several
high-growth G-77 countries (especially Brazil, South
Africa, India, and China—the so-called “BASIC” group)
rapidly increased their share in the global emissions
of greenhouse gases. For example, China outpaced the
US in 2006 as the largest emitter of carbon diox-
ide (New York Times 2007). Faced with difficulties
in securing the energy to fuel their economic expan-
sion, these emerging countries increasingly realized that,
although exempted from mandatory action, it was in
their own interest to adopt more proactive climate
policies (Heggelund and Buan 2009). Consequently,
to preempt their marginalization in future transnational
policymaking, these large G-77 economies shifted their
frames from “polluter pays” to “ecological moderniza-
tion.” This brought the US back to the negotiation table
and culminated in the 2007 Bali Roadmap (Ott et al.
2008), whose realization was fostered by the UNFCCC
executive secretary. Subsequently, although the highly
awaited 2009 Copenhagen Climate Summit (COP-15)
did not generate an agreement with binding commit-
ments, it did produce an important shift in the BASIC
countries’ receptivity toward (relative) emission reduc-
tion targets for their countries, which was formally con-
firmed at the 2010 Cancún Agreement (COP-16). Their
pledge to assume responsibility and take action was
a significant step toward increasing consensus around
a transnational commons logic. Table 2 summarizes
major field frames and related actor-level frame shifts,
and it shows mechanisms and consequences that we
explain next.
The Social Construction of a Commons Logic
About Climate Change
In addition to tracking the 12 actor-level frame shifts,
close examination of the unfolding field frames enabled
us to see whether and how these shifts contributed to
an emerging consensus about climate change among key
players in the field between 1969 and 2010. Our analysis
revealed that, eventually, a number of actors converged
around a commons logic for climate change, although
not all the key actors embraced this logic simultaneously
and to the same extent. We found that the emerging logic
of climate change as a transnational commons involves
the satisfaction of three conditions. First, actors must
agree that a problem exists in which their fates are inter-
connected. Thus, no actor can escape the consequences
of the problem. Second, a commons logic requires actors
to perceive the vulnerability of the resource as a critical
issue and to implicate themselves as part of the prob-
lem. Third, actors must commit themselves to mitigation
actions that address the problem and diminish the degra-
dation of the commons. Satisfaction of this condition
enables the development of governance mechanisms for
a transnational commons. As the five field frames gained
currency, increasing convergence around these three con-
ditions gradually emerged.
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Table 2 Field Frames, Actor-Level Frames, Actions, and Mechanisms
Year(s) Actor shift no. Initial frame New frame Action Mechanism Explanation
Field Frame 1: Viewing climate change as an anthropogenic, transnational problem
1969–1991 1a The atmosphere is a
“dump” with unlimited
capacity or a national
security issue
The atmosphere is a
fragile global
commons,
vulnerable to
human-induced
degradation
UNCHE and WMO
conferences voice
concerns about
human damage to
environment
Collective
theorizing
Gradual acceptance
of human impact on
climate change
1988 1b Climate-induced problems
are national issues that
create territorial
disputes
Human-induced
changes in the
atmosphere pose a
transnational
commons problem
Scientists report
evidence of
climate change
Collective
theorizing
Environmentalism
emerges as an
“institution”
Field Frame 2: Accepting binding targets for historical polluters
1996–1997 2a Climate policy is a an
economic threat; only
voluntary targets are
reasonable
Binding targets are
permissible when
accompanied by
flexible market
instruments
The US formally
proposes binding,
quantified targets
in conjunction with
flexible market
instruments
Issue
linkage
The US combines the
AOSIS proposal of
binding targets with
its own preference
of cost-effective
market instruments
1996–1997 2b Top-down regulation is
imperative to mitigate
climate change
Top-down regulation
and binding targets
are imperative to
mitigate climate
change
The EU becomes a
strong advocate of
binding national
targets
Active
learning
The EU readily
subscribes to the
US proposal of
binding targets to
obtain strong
commitment by
industrialized
nations
Field Frame 3: Viewing global carbon markets as acceptable mitigation instruments
1997 3a Domestic policies and
measures are
imperative for historical
polluters
Global market
instruments for
historical polluters
are acceptable
G-77
proposes a
compensation fund
for developing
countries and
gives up
resistance to
market instruments
Issue
linkage
Prospects of “free”
investments pave
the way for G-77
accepting market
instruments
1997 3b Prescriptive policies and
measures are required
for industrialized
countries
Global market
instruments are
acceptable when
including binding
emission targets
The EU gives up
resistance to
market instruments
Issue
linkage
The EU gets its
much-desired
climate agreement
with binding
individual emission
caps
∼2000 3c Prescriptive policies and
measures are
imperative for polluters
Market-based
instruments are
acceptable
Greenpeace shifts
from advocating
prescriptive
regulation to
acquiescing to
market-like
measures
Legitimacy
seeking
Having lost former
allies, Greenpeace
has to reconsider its
position to regain
influence
In Phase 1 (between 1969 and 1991), leading sci-
entists, environmental NGOs, and the US government
came to concur about the first condition while many oth-
ers still did not subscribe to it. In Phase 2 (1992–1997),
some of the original actors also subscribed to the sec-
ond condition, whereas additional actors signed on to
the first condition. In Phase 3, still greater acceptance
of the first two conditions occurred, although acceptance
of Condition 3 was still not widespread, even by 2010.
Thus, the logic that climate change is a transnational
commons has not yet been fully constructed within the
field. Figure 2 represents the evolving consensus around
each of the three conditions.
By arraying the frame changes and mechanisms
chronologically, we also realized that certain mecha-
nisms enabled stakeholders to converge in their framing
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Table 2 (cont’d)
Year(s) Actor shift no. Initial frame New frame Action Mechanism Explanation
Field Frame 4: Implementing carbon market instruments for climate change mitigation
1997–2003 4a Climate change is
not man-made
and mitigation
measures are
costly
Climate change is
human-induced
and responsibility
needs to be
assumed
BP leaves Global
Climate Coalition
and creates an
intrafirm
carbon-trading
scheme
Active learning
Legitimacy
seeking
Moral legitimacy and
cost factors drive BP
to become first mover
2002 4b Climate policy is
an economic
threat
Ecological
modernization
reconciles
different interests
The UK adopts
national policy
inspired by BP’s
carbon-trading
scheme
Catalytic
amplification
BP and shell are
influential in UK
climate policy
preparation
2005 4c Prescriptive
policies and
measures are
required
Ecological
modernization is
efficient
The EU harmonizes
emissions-trading
schemes of
individual member
states
Active learning
Catalytic
amplification
The UK scheme strongly
influences the EU’s
choice of one single
scheme to guarantee
a single market
Field Frame 5: Taking mitigation actions without formal obligations
∼2000 5a US participation is
contingent on
actions of all
other countries
Ecological
modernization
reconciles
different interests
Local governments
break with federal
stance and initiate
local actions to
reduce carbon
footprint
Legitimacy
seeking
Catalytic
amplification
Moral convictions
coupled with national
inaction and
transnational role
models spur local
actions
2009 5b Mitigation actions
are only for
historical
polluters
All major polluters
need to assume
responsibility and
act
BASIC countries
pledge to realize
much higher
energy-efficiency
rates in their
economies
Active learning BASIC countries
become aware of the
necessity of proactive
climate measures to
sustain domestic
economic growth
Notes. In Field Frame 1, elite actors advance the view that climate change is a human-induced, global problem (Condition 1); the initiators
are elite scientists, environmental NGOs, the US, and transnational organizations. In Field Frame 2, the EU and US accept binding targets,
leading most industrialized countries to accept responsibility for their historically high emissions (Condition 2), and the initiator is AOSIS. In
Field Frame 3, major countries, firms, and NGOs share the view that global market instruments can mitigate climate change (Condition 3),
and the initiator is the US. In Field Frame 4, actors at multiple levels launch carbon trading schemes (Condition 3), and the initiator is BP.
In Field Frame 5, actors not committed by the Kyoto Protocol recognize their responsibility (Condition 2) and commit to mitigation actions
(Condition 3); initiators include the EU and the UNFCCC executive secretary.
over time, progressively satisfying each commons condi-
tion. We identified five distinct underlying mechanisms
that facilitated the interpretive shifts within the field and
the emergence of consensus about a commons logic.
By linking our mechanisms with the conditions for the
emergence of a commons logic, we developed a second-
order process model for this evolution (see Figure 3).
We now describe how each condition emerged from our
data and which mechanism(s) served to promote greater
consensus around each one.
Condition 1. Prior to the introduction of ideas about
climate change as a phenomenon of concern, the Earth’s
climate was viewed as a commodity for unfettered pri-
vate use. With climate change, the Earth and its future
became socially redefined as a shared concern in which
the fates of its people became interconnected. This sig-
nificant change in the depiction of the humanity–nature
relationship marked a frame shift from a previous view
of unbridled economic growth, based on a strong market
logic, to one of ecological interdependence, rooted in the
community logic, where one “shared planet” is seen to
have a limited capacity to absorb the greenhouse gases
without significant temperature increases and environ-
mental degradation (Oberthür and Ott 1999). This aware-
ness of interconnected fates forms the first condition for
the construction of a commons logic: the problem is
neither salient nor of concern to many actors without
widespread consensus about this interdependence. For
this first condition to be met, certain actors must theorize
the existence of a problem that affects everyone, whereas
others must subscribe to this thesis. As Figure 2 reveals,
this began to happen for some actors in the early phase
and was largely satisfied in 1992, when political lead-
ers of 188 countries adopted the UNFCCC at the Rio
Earth Summit. By 2010, the majority of key actors in the
climate change field had accepted this condition. In par-
ticular, the emergence of environmentalism as a com-
ponent of the community logic—with a cognitive shift
from nature versus society (with efforts at subjugating
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Figure 2 Degree of Consensus Around Key Conditions of a Climate Change Logic
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and eradicating nature) to nature for society (emphasiz-
ing interdependence between humans and ecosystems)—
played a major role in shifting some actors toward
acceptance of this first condition (Frank et al. 2000).
Figure 3 Process Model for the Evolution of a Commons Logic
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This led human beings to be seen as increasingly respon-
sible for sustaining the global ecosystem. We now exam-
ine the mechanism that promoted consensus around this
first condition.
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Satisfying the first condition for a transnational com-
mons began with the increasingly shared view that a
problem existed in which the fates of actors are inter-
connected (Trist 1983, Van Gusteren 1998). Our data
suggest that collective theorizing (cf. Strang and Soule
1998) about “recursive” shocks is the mechanism that
promoted this awareness.5 Several elite US politicians
and scientists, who collectively served as institutional
entrepreneurs, lobbied to support the research that even-
tually helped to define anthropogenic climate change
as an environmental issue. Initially, scientists engaged
in collective theorizing in response to extreme weather
events that served as a key mechanism for change.
Elite oceanographers and atmospheric scientists lever-
aged opportunities generated by various events to recon-
struct anthropogenic climate change as a threat to a
valued resource that needed protection from brazen
industrialism. By defining climate change as an envi-
ronmental issue, these scientists broadened the scope
of environmentalism and, in the process, created “crisis
awareness” about the issue, diffusing it to a higher level
of public and political attention and attracting increased
budgets by policy makers to address it. Thus, they ren-
dered these events disruptive enough to bring them to
wider notice. Elite entrepreneurship was evidenced in
this early period by MIT’s Wilson, the WMO, and the
UN Environment Programme, who began to raise levels
of public attention and political interest in the “crisis.”
Consequently, many actors began to embrace the first
condition of a commons logic.
Condition 2. The second condition of a commons
logic requires actors to construct resource vulnerability
as a critical issue and to implicate themselves as part
of the problem (e.g., overuse by all has led to degra-
dation of the commons). Without a readily identifiable
villain, everyone is required to take collective responsi-
bility if the problem is going to be addressed. The accep-
tance of market instruments by the G-77 and the EU, as
well as the US’s and EU’s consent to binding emission-
reduction targets, by 1997, contributed to a growing
consensus around the second condition. Agreement at
Kyoto on a universal protocol that included economic
instruments such as a market for pollutants to accom-
modate the market logic favored by the US, individual
mandatory emission caps to meet the EU state logic
of setting government-led targets, and the exemption of
developing countries from binding emission reduction
targets—based on the community logic of common but
differentiated responsibilities—was facilitated by several
mechanisms that promoted consensus on these issues.
These frame shifts illustrate the mechanism of issue
linkage, often used for reaching collaborative outcomes
in negotiations (Sebenius 1983). Because issues do not
exist in a social vacuum, the violation of one agree-
ment carries important repercussions that may extend
well beyond the focal issue (Axelrod 1984). Through
issue linkage, actors cluster different issues with positive
interdependence to open up more possible solutions to
such deadlocks (Haas 1980). Linking issues can break
deadlocks by gaining actors’ commitment on relatively
low-priority issues and then getting them to cooper-
ate on high-priority issues (Sebenius 1983). In making
such trades, actors typically reframe their rationale—
from seeing an option as a loss to perceiving it as a gain
(Elliott et al. 2003).
One of the reasons why the G-77 dropped its funda-
mental opposition to the use of market-based instruments
was the CDM’s explicitly stated “win–win” rhetoric
around the twin objectives of emission reductions for
industrialized countries and accelerated economic devel-
opment in developing nations through the transfer of
green technologies. Also, because climate change was
not the highest priority for most G-77 members, they
cared little if it failed. In a similar vein, by 1997,
the historical contribution of industrialized countries to
climate change was clearly highlighted by the IPCC’s
work (especially its 1995 Second Assessment Report),
thereby raising the awareness of these nations that they
were contributing to the problem. When it became
clear that an agreement was within reach that included
binding commitments yet relied on market instruments,
the EU—alarmed by the IPCC’s Second Assessment
Report—was willing to give up its resistance to these
policy instruments. Issue linkage was also the likely
mechanism that enabled the US to sign the Kyoto Pro-
tocol in 1997. The US’s introduction of market-based
instruments added an issue that reduced the economic
costs and increased flexibility for companies, thereby
bringing emission reduction targets within more man-
ageable levels. Thus, at that time, the US reframed its
previous advocacy of voluntary measures only to the
endorsement of binding reduction targets, paving the
way for the Kyoto agreement.
We observed active learning as another mechanism
that promoted frame shifts in the service of Condition 2.
Active learning occurs when new information and evi-
dence or changes in material and discursive conditions
prompt actors to rethink the assumptions about the cal-
culus of perceived gains and losses underpinning their
logics. For learning to occur, parties’ beliefs about cause-
and-effect relationships must change (Dobbin et al. 2007,
Elkins and Simmons 2005). One example is when the
EU accepted the proposal of binding emission targets,
put on the table by AOSIS negotiators and formally
proposed by the US delegation, as an additional possi-
bility to commit historical polluters to action. Another
instance is when BP broke ranks with other oil-and-
gas companies to assume its responsibility for contribut-
ing to climate change. The company learned that a
proactive climate policy offered substantial cost-saving
potential and benefits in terms of goodwill among
its constituencies. A third instance was the BASIC
group members’ shift from eschewing responsibility to
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agreeing that they had become major economic play-
ers with high emission levels who had to assume their
fair share of the mitigation burden. These countries had
learned that their continued economic growth would be
compromised without significantly revising their pro-
duction practices (for instance, through leapfrog energy-
efficiency improvements), thereby contributing to the
global mitigation efforts.
Another mechanism that fostered consensus around
the second condition was legitimacy seeking. This mech-
anism was at least partly responsible for US subnational
actors’ shifts to unilaterally adopt climate change miti-
gation policies. In this case, the shifts were toward moral
legitimacy, the need to show solidarity with an issue of
concern (Franck 1995). Once President Bush declared
the Kyoto agreement dead on arrival in the US, many
local actors who believed in the adverse effects of cli-
mate change were frustrated. Against the backdrop of
a climate policy vacuum created by federal inaction,
these actors took it upon themselves to initiate mitiga-
tion actions. Al Gore’s influential documentary and book
An Inconvenient Truth framed these in terms of moral
convictions: “We all want the same thing: for our chil-
dren and the generations after them to inherit a clean and
beautiful planet capable of supporting a healthy human
civilization” (Gore 2006, p. 278). Thus, the internal con-
victions of many US citizens, local governments, and
firms made it morally unacceptable to stand by and do
nothing. Instead, they opted for what they believed was
“the right thing to do” (Suchman 1995, p. 579). Conse-
quently, convergence around the second condition for a
commons logic was driven by several mechanisms: issue
linkage, bringing major nation-states on board during the
Kyoto negotiations; active learning, enabling actors such
as BP and eventually most industrialized countries to
change frames in the face of new information; and legit-
imacy seeking, driving the involvement of progressive
companies and US states and citizens.
Condition 3. Forging a working consensus in trans-
national commons is highly challenging because of the
degree of diversity, dispersion, and disparity of actors
and their frames in such fields and the lack of an overar-
ching governmental authority to impose top-down regu-
lations. Because one critical component in establishing a
new logic within a field is ensuring its governance, Con-
dition 3 needs to be satisfied to ensure the construction
of a commons logic. We identified three mechanisms
that promoted actors’ collective mitigation actions in the
climate change field.
First, we identified catalytic amplification, in which
actions at lower levels shifted the calculus for higher-
level actors, prompting decisions to move from the
corporate to the national to the transnational level, and
promoting wider acceptance of a transnational commons
logic. Building on Hoffman and Ocasio’s (2001) and
Nigam and Ocasio’s (2010) idea that events can precip-
itate field-level shifts, we argue that actors in a field can
function as catalyzers who amplify changes in response
to the initial precipitating actions through an irreversible
chain of events (Hedström and Swedberg 1998). Sewell
(1996, p. 871) made a similar observation about the
“cascading character of events,” which disrupt struc-
tures by “touching off dislocations and rearticulations of
overlapping or contiguous structures.” This mechanism
played an important role in the diffusion of mitigation
actions, expressly when the initiatives of certain actors
catalyzed the actions of others. Our data show a pattern
of linkages between BP’s decision to adopt a carbon-
trading scheme, the UK’s decision to design a national
system for emissions trading, and the EU’s adoption of
a pan-European scheme. BP’s action became one of sev-
eral factors that prompted the UK to act, and, ultimately,
BP served on the Royal Commission that advised the
UK on the design of its carbon market. Then, shortly
after the opening of the UK’s market, the EU, a staunch
adversary of market mechanisms, quickly followed suit
and launched its own emissions-trading system to regain
market control. These decisions, taken together, repre-
sent a catalytic process of amplifying influence within
the transnational field.
Catalytic amplification also explains why subnational
actors in the US launched their own mitigation initia-
tives despite inaction by the US federal government.
Local US actors were inspired to launch localized ini-
tiatives because of their involvement in dense transna-
tional social networks. Many local US actors reframed
themselves as international actors to lay claim to an
international stage and debate. Cities explicitly refer-
enced international emission-reduction norms as con-
tained in the Kyoto Protocol (e.g., the US Mayors
Initiative), whereas states localized international norms
such as the UK’s voluntary 60%–70% reduction tar-
gets over 50 years. These local actors were engaging in
what Keck and Sikkink (1998, p. 93) referred to as a
“boomerang pattern”—influenced by transnational advo-
cacy networks to “walk the talk” and pressurize their
(federal) governments.
Second, the mechanism of active learning, identified
above, was also conducive to enhanced consensus
around the third commons condition. One example,
recounted by UNFCCC executive secretary Yvo de Boer,
is that the EU, after losing the battle for prescrip-
tive policies and measures, became aware that emis-
sion reduction targets could also be realized efficiently
through an emissions trading scheme that only specifies
the overall target, rather than individual standards for
each sector. Another instance is the BASIC countries’
pursuit of important energy-efficiency improvements
and enhanced reliance on renewable energy carriers to
enable sustained economic growth while also containing,
at least in relative terms, their greenhouse gas emissions.
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Third, we identified legitimacy seeking, as illustrated
by Greenpeace’s shift to accepting a largely market-
based climate regime. Although, like most NGOs,
Greenpeace initially pressed for a centralized command-
and-control approach to regulate emissions, it found
itself increasingly isolated in opposing the use of market
instruments. Once all other actors, including the EU and
G-77 countries, had agreed to the use of market mech-
anisms, the NGOs were left standing alone. Realizing
that the proverbial train had left the station and it was
not on it, Greenpeace acquiesced to the less preferred
option to avoid being excluded from further discussion.
When a majority of powerful actors adopt a controver-
sial practice, it can lose its contentiousness and become
normalized as even staunch opponents shift their stances
(Briscoe and Safford 2008). In this case, Greenpeace not
only changed its frame but also began to promote the
positive elements of the plan to preserve its voice in the
climate change debate.
An increasing sense of urgency, generated by more
extreme weather events and well-publicized messages of
elite entrepreneurs (such as Al Gore), has led more and
more people not only to view their fates as intercon-
nected but also to perceive their own activities as con-
tributing to climate change. However, despite progress,
consensus around the willingness to take collective
action to mitigate the damage from further climate
change is not yet widespread (see Figure 2). Several
key stakeholders (such as the US federal government,
many G-77 countries, and conservative firms) are not,
or are only marginally, on board. Because the existence
and governance of a commons implies collective aware-
ness, responsibility, and action, we argue that a com-
mons logic has gained traction since agreement with
these three premises has grown over the period of study,
but that consensus about how to and who should take
ameliorative action is still elusive in this field.
Discussion
Socially Constructing Commons
We provided an account of how a transnational com-
mons logic emerged in the field of climate change.
Whereas the study of one type of change in plu-
ralistic institutional fields involves understanding how
these fields move from incoherence to relative coher-
ence (Schneiberg and Clemens 2006), the process is
more complex in transnational fields. Although debates
around a commons logic still persist, we identified some
of the key episodes in the field’s evolution between
1969 and 2010, when certain actors noticeably changed
their frames to enable the emergence of a growing con-
sensus around climate change as a commons problem.
Although, arguably, all of our examples do not carry the
same weight with respect to their impact on the field
because they occurred at different levels (e.g., within
MNCs, NGOs, or (groups of) nations) and involved
actors with different degrees of influence, they still pro-
vide vital insights into processes by which field frames
gain currency and a commons logic emerges in transna-
tional fields.
Three Conditions for Constructing a Commons Logic.
Tracking the evolution of the climate change field over
four decades enabled us to answer our first research
question. Initially, the field’s diverse actors operated
under the auspices of different institutional governance
systems, and each had “a different way of looking at
the global reality and global problems and, therefore,
a unique approach to them” (Finger 2008, p. 48). These
disparate ways of framing climate change included
actors viewing it as (1) a false issue, a nonissue, a local
issue, or a global issue; (2) an issue for which they
bore differential degrees of responsibility (for past, cur-
rent, or future damage); and (3) one that did or did
not require ameliorative action and could be addressed
through contrasting approaches. By analyzing the actors’
frame shifts over time, we identified three conditions that
were gradually embraced by a wide array of actors. We
suggest that convergence around these three conditions
is necessary for the construction of a transnational com-
mons logic in a field. However, with respect to climate
change, over the past 40 years there has been substantial
convergence only around the first condition—a sense of
a common plight or “positively correlated fate” (Trist
1983, Van Gusteren 1998).
A second stringent condition for the construction of
a field as a commons is that actors acknowledge that
their own behavior is both a source of and solution to
the problem. In the climate change field, this insight
began to emerge in 1992 with the UNFCCC. By 2010,
there was a fair degree of convergence around this sec-
ond condition. Thus, unlike the typical social move-
ment framing, in which an external enemy is theorized
as a reason to mobilize—“us against them” (Benford
and Snow 2000)—actors in transnational commons must
acknowledge their collective complicity, as illustrated by
cartoonist Walt Kelly’s character Pogo, who asserted,
“We have met the enemy and he is us.” Collective aware-
ness by actors of their complicity in creating a commons
problem and a coincident interpretation of the collec-
tive nature of a cause (Fligstein 1997) heightens actors’
collective identification with the problem and allows for
practices of collaborative engagement. In effect, con-
sensus emerges around the view that a coalition of the
whole, or at least of the most powerful actors, is ulti-
mately needed if the problem is to be addressed.
Finally, for a commons logic to gain full force, a third
condition must be met: the actors must agree on the col-
lective action required to remedy the problem—that is,
what practices are going to be collectively undertaken.
Satisfying this condition is a tall order, and full con-
sensus about collective mitigation measures has, so far,
Ansari, Wijen, and Gray: An Institutional Perspective on the “Tragedy of the Commons”
1032 Organization Science 24(4), pp. 1014–1040, © 2013 INFORMS
not been achieved. Because meeting the three conditions
involves the collaboration of actors with divergent log-
ics, the commons logic must encompass elements of the
underlying logics of key actors. As a result, the transna-
tional commons logic is a hybrid, made up of a vari-
ety of core logics such as market, state, profession, and
community.
Multiple Mechanisms. In response to our second
research question, we have argued that satisfying the
three conditions within a field and achieving growing
consensus around an emergent commons logic is likely
to require a combination of mechanisms to trigger a shift
in actors’ existing frames. Like Tilly (2001, p. 24), we
found that several mechanisms that explain “salient fea-
tures of episodes or significant differences among them”
may operate in conjunction or in succession at different
points in time during the field’s evolution.
Collective theorization by key institutional entrepre-
neurs was the mechanism for promoting convergence
around the first condition. In the case of climate change,
as in many others, exogenous events, also referred to
as shocks, jolts, or discontinuities, can play a central
role in reconfiguring a field (Hoffman 1999, Meyer
1982). These events create an occasion for theoriz-
ing about their causes and consequences and may pro-
mote proposals for change (Greenwood et al. 2002).
However, events are not inherently disruptive, and
their saliency depends on the degree of contestation
they may engender (Hoffman and Ocasio 2001, Munir
2005); consequently, not all events lead to institutional
transformation. Whereas many studies have focused on
institutional entrepreneurship arising from actors on the
fringes or outside an organizational field (e.g., Maguire
et al. 2004), in this case, “elite actors” (Greenwood
and Suddaby 2006) and “high-status players” (Hoffman
and Ocasio 2001) promoted change through their social
influence and power to flag a potential problem, inten-
sify interest, and catapult it to prominence on the world
stage.
To satisfy the second condition, some reconciliation
of these frames is needed if actors differ in how they
ascribe blame and responsibility for the emerging prob-
lem as well as their willingness to take remedial actions.
Mechanisms promoting such frame change in our study
included issue linkage, active learning, and legitimacy
seeking. Actors begin to assume such responsibility
when they find ways to link issues to propose possi-
ble actions, but others may feel pressured to join the
bandwagon, even at the expense of their initial pref-
erences. For instance, the G-77’s and EU’s acceptance
of market instruments (as a result of issue linkage)
isolated the environmental movement, which then felt
forced to abandon its opposition to market instruments
and join the coalition backing the Kyoto agreement to
gain pragmatic legitimacy. Other actors (e.g., US states)
sought moral legitimacy—accepting responsibility for
moral reasons (such as ensuring a viable planet for future
generations). With respect to learning, actors such as the
BASIC countries learned that they increasingly became
part of the problem and needed to assume their fair share
of responsibility given the steep uptick in their emissions
and the impossibility to sustain growth along business-
as-usual trajectories.
Three mechanisms were pivotal in advancing a work-
ing consensus around the third condition for a transna-
tional commons logic: active learning, as exemplified by
the EU’s increasing appreciation of emissions trading
as an effective mitigation instrument; legitimacy seek-
ing, as evidenced by Greenpeace’s acceptance of market
instruments; and catalytic amplification at the field level,
in which actions at one level trigger actions at another
level, such as measures taken at the corporate, national,
and transnational levels to establish a market for carbon
trading (e.g., BP, the UK, and the EU, respectively).
Nonlinear Diffusion of Frames and the Emergence
of a Transnational Commons Logic. Our third research
question focused on how actor-level frame shifts lead to
the emergence of a transnational commons logic. Our
findings suggest that transnational fields are likely to be
characterized by distributed theorization, where actors
embrace distinct dimensions of an emergent hybrid
logic. Convergence around a commons logic is contin-
gent on different institutional actors with different inter-
ests and histories reaching equifinal meaning—that is,
coming to at least a minimal level of agreement about
what action to take, even if they differ on the reasons
for taking the action (Donnellon et al. 1986). The log-
ics held by different actors need not be coincident, but
they have to adjust their frames sufficiently to tip the
scales toward the emergence of field frames that can
eventually lead to the construction of a hybrid com-
mons logic. In our case, the emergence of the first
field frame—emphasizing climate change as an anthro-
pogenic, transnational problem—enabled the first con-
dition of a transnational commons logic to be largely
satisfied. The rise of the second field frame—promoting
binding targets for historical polluters—began to address
the second condition. Finally, the emergence of the third,
fourth, and fifth field frames—agreeing on and imple-
menting carbon markets as mitigation instruments and
taking actions without formal obligations—contributed
to the satisfaction of the second and third conditions.
Therefore, increasing convergence of actors around the
five field-level frames promoted the construction of a
transnational commons logic. Our model explains how
consensus might emerge through the construction of a
hybrid logic embodying different interests, even when
actors do not necessarily shift their underlying logics.
This model also differs from fields in which com-
pliance is enforced through discipline or domination.
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Because transnational fields are characterized by the
absence of a supranational authority, actors are unlikely
to have systemic power or the ability to compel con-
formity (Djelic and Quack 2008). Rather, agreement
depends on negotiation among actors wielding episodic
power (Lawrence et al. 2001). Consensus, however, is
not an inevitable outcome of negotiations. The diver-
sity and complexity of transnational fields with multi-
ple and distributed sources of theorization creates the
potential for conflict among diverse blocking coalitions
that may forestall agreements (Lax and Sebenius 1986).
However, in instances where an agreement seems immi-
nent, some coalition members may “jump ship” at the
last minute, and nonmembers may sign on at the 11th
hour, generating discontinuities in the process. Indeed,
the way in which frames diffuse in complex transna-
tional fields may, like the weather, be more accurately
described as nonlinear (Strang and Soule 1998). Given
the interdependencies among actors in a commons, non-
linearity occurs because changes in one location (or level
of analysis) within the field are affected by changes in
other locations or levels (Purdy and Gray 2009) and
may generate unexpected perturbations elsewhere in the
field. This can lead to “scale shifts” (Tarrow 2005),
prompting other field actors, who embrace different log-
ics, to shift their frames enough to enable the emer-
gence of field frames and the resultant construction of a
new, hybrid logic. The EU’s and Greenpeace’s eventual
acceptance of market measures represents such “about-
faces” in response to actions taken by others. As the
negotiating table tipped toward market solutions, the
landscape of choices for these actors dramatically nar-
rowed, leading them to subscribe to a less preferred
option. Highly contested transnational fields are charac-
terized by “panarchy” and the “Byzantine mishmash” of
nonlinear dynamics (Watts 2003, p. 291). Deals among
some players can conspire to change the various decision
parameters for others. Shifts at lower levels (e.g., within
nation-states) can also be prompted by other nations or,
conversely, can undermine their own previous national
commitments—for instance, declining support for cli-
mate change in the US (Klein 2011). Thus, the pos-
sibility of backsliding and erosion of agreements also
exists. Analyzing how different frames diffuse and con-
verge in transnational fields for the construction of a new
logic can, therefore, help identify the dynamics of emer-
gent systems, linking noncontiguous institutions, organi-
zations, and individuals (Detlef 2006).
Broader Theorizing About Commons Construction
Although our analysis drew on the social construction
of a physical or tangible commons, our theorizing also
has relevance for the institutionalization of intangible
commons, which often span the public–private divide.
On the surface, social and natural environments are
very different types of systems, operating on vastly
different timescales. Yet these systems are interlinked
elements of a complex, larger sociotechnical system
with simultaneous tendencies toward stability and col-
lapse (Levy and Lichtenstein 2012). Intangible commons
include cultural commons such as digital space (e.g.,
regulation of the Internet; see Bislev and Flyverbom
2008), knowledge commons (e.g., openness of access;
see von Hippel and von Krogh 2003), and reputation
commons (e.g., spillovers of corporate (in)action; see
Barnett and King 2008). As with tangible commons,
actions by one firm in intangible commons can threaten
the success and survival of other, interconnected firms.
This was evidenced by collateral damage to auditing
firms in general, not just Arthur Andersen, from the
Enron scandal. On the other hand, governance structures
for intangible commons also arise despite the risk of
free riding, as illustrated by the US chemical industry’s
voluntary Responsible Care initiative to reduce industry-
wide harm from the errors of individual firms (Hoffman
1999). Our explanations about the construction of a
transnational commons logic and the mechanisms under-
pinning requisite shifts in frames may inform the origins
of these self-regulatory initiatives and other cooperative
arrangements forged by businesses and NGOs to certify
ethical or sustainable practices.
Our findings also have implications for ongoing ten-
sions between consumers and industry regarding intel-
lectual property rights in the digital commons. With
individual free riding evident in widespread online
piracy and in the belief that Internet content is free,
industries ranging from music to publishing have strug-
gled to capture value from their online offerings. Some
of the mechanisms we identified may foster consensus
building around the legitimate production and consump-
tion of online content as well as around key obligations
and responsibilities in the digital commons. Finally, our
insights also have relevance for other types of transna-
tional fields with a sheer complexity of parameters
and interests, such as global finance. Calls for a more
coordinated transnational, rather than a state-centered,
regulation system of global finance, have been grow-
ing, especially since the recent financial crisis, which is
widely believed to be a systemic failure that began with
the advent of an unregulated subprime mortgage market
in the US and eventually triggered a global crisis. Some
have argued for the need to view global finance as a
common pool resource, where different actors—savers,
investors, entrepreneurs, and borrowers—are affected by
each other’s actions, both in the short term and in the
long term (Goldin and Vogel 2010). The recent finan-
cial crisis has been argued to demonstrate a failure
to sustainably govern the “global financial commons”
(Barnes 2006, Goldin and Vogel 2010). In the same way
as global regulation should limit greenhouse gas emis-
sions, the regulation of global finance has been argued
to be a means for limiting “toxic asset” creation, fraud,
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and illegal financial flows, which are widely believed to
lead to tragedies. However, when it comes to governing
global financial markets, there is no financial regulator or
“World Financial Authority” (Eatwell and Taylor 2000)
with the powers to set rules like drawing up international
accounting standards in the way that the World Trade
Organization has the authority to regulate and enforce
international law in trade disputes. Instead, sovereign
states, ministries, and central banks negotiate among
themselves for what they believe to be in their national
interest, despite the efforts of the Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision to promote voluntary compliance
by its members. Because the field of finance is still far
away from a shared global approach to addressing finan-
cial problems, global finance is a candidate for being
a transnational commons, but not yet one. Similarly, a
commons logic could potentially emerge in the fields
of global waste management, health, and security, char-
acterized by dynamic complexities that link individual,
family, community, national, and global levels.
Our theorization thus has broader implications for how
transnational issues can come to be constructed as com-
mons, even if the frames that need to change and diffuse
might be different from those adopted by the actors with
respect to climate change. However, although recursive
shocks such as nuclear accidents may catalyze the emer-
gence of a commons logic in a wide range of transna-
tional fields, even these kinds of clarion calls are usually
only the first step toward reaching consensus on all three
conditions needed for the construction of a commons
logic in a field. Indeed, many noncommons fields have
made some progress toward being constructed as com-
mons. For example, in strategy and innovation man-
agement, scholars and practitioners alike have begun
to move away from viewing firms as atomistic enti-
ties toward an “ecosystem” perspective that makes inter-
dependencies among firms and their innovations more
explicit (Adner 2006).
Although our arguments may hold for many transna-
tional fields, common to these fields is that many actors
do not derive their power to mobilize action from the
state. However, in local or national contexts, where
stakeholder power is more concentrated than diffused,
a partial or a higher degree of concerted action may
be reached through coercion rather than through nego-
tiation. For example, the Chinese government was able
to restrict Google’s operations in China. And, at times,
even businesses can unilaterally exercise power, such as
Walmart forcing its suppliers to adopt certain standards.
Finally, achieving consensus in transnational fields is
far from being inevitable. Competition between different
and expanding governance constellations that cross over
multiple jurisdictions can lead to governance contradic-
tions or even loopholes in polycentric transnational fields
(Djelic and Quack 2010) characterized by intractable
conflicts (Gray et al. 2007). Tight integration efforts
in fields characterized by high levels of diversity and
conflict, such as deep and protracted ethnic differences
vying for domination, may endanger their very exis-
tence and lead to fragmentation and a “distrust spiral”
(Djelic and Sahlin-Andersson 2006). Examples could be
the Israeli–Palestinian conflict where, even though there
is a potential commons, it will take more collective the-
orization and other mechanisms to produce consensus
(peace). National or local identities, practices, preroga-
tives, and rootedness may be so powerful that they can
considerably retard, if not prevent, the construction of a
transnational commons logic.
Conclusion
As global initiatives reduce the importance of national
boundaries, new problems emerge that necessitate insti-
tutional examination at the transnational level (Djelic
and Sahlin-Andersson 2006). Transnational problems,
especially those related to commons, pose formidable
challenges for business, governmental, and civic lead-
ers globally. Understanding how one such commons has
been constructed provides insights for scholars interested
in how hybrid logics emerge in transnational settings
(Wooten and Hoffman 2008), especially because clas-
sic economic formulations of these kinds of fields assert
that consensus is highly unlikely without an overarch-
ing authority to impose and enforce regulations (Hardin
1968). To portray the global climate commons as a social
construction is not to diminish its importance, relevance,
or reality (Grundmann and Stehr 2010), but to study
how a transnational issue transforms into a commons
and why actions may be forestalled.
Contributions
Our first contribution is to explain how a commons
logic is constructed in a transnational field. Drawing
on institutional rather than rational models of com-
mons, we offer an alternative explanation for how certain
issues come to be constructed as transnational commons,
what kinds of mechanisms enable revisions in actors’
frames, and how claims about the system or problem
diffuse through a field. Institutional accounts deempha-
size the exercise of individual agency—privileged in
economic models of commons—in favor of agency for
other actors—that is, agency shifts from “actorhood to
otherhood” (Meyer and Jepperson 2000, p. 107) with-
out necessarily entailing a conflict between self-interest
and social values (Parsons 1937). In contrast to conven-
tional economic arguments positing the implausibility of
collective governance in the absence of an overarching
authority, an institutional perspective offers insights into
how field actors, rooted in different institutional logics,
create different frames about commons’ issues and come
to revise their frames in response to others’ actions,
and how large-scale consensus among dissenting actors
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can emerge to govern commons without such an author-
ity. Thus, an institutional perspective helps explain how
social actors ascribe meaning to all kinds of natural (e.g.,
the atmosphere) and cultural (e.g., the World Wide Web)
environments, construct them as commons, and devise
collective strategies to govern them.
Second, whereas recent work has theorized the com-
plexity of fields characterized by different and often
conflicting institutional pressures and logics (Lounsbury
2007, Pache and Santos 2010, Purdy and Gray 2009),
we offer insights into how a new logic is constructed
and changes the “rules of the game”—a task that North
(1990) suggested is particularly suited to institutional
analysis. We identified three distinct conditions for the
construction of a commons logic: building agreement
around the interconnectedness of actor fates related to a
commons, admitting collective complicity in creating the
commons problem rather than externalizing it to others,
and sharing understanding of how to jointly address the
problem. Current depictions of framing and mobilization
offered by social movement and institutional scholars
typically portray actors as aggrieved victims of societal
injustices, making clear distinctions between victims
and perpetrators. Instead, in transnational commons, the
focus of framing is to implicate actors as collectively
responsible for the problem and its solutions—that is, as
perpetrators, victims, and saviors.
Third, building on the work of Nigam and Ocasio
(2010) and Liu et al. (2012), we identified several mech-
anisms that precipitate microrevisions in actors’ frames,
leading at times to the emergence of wider consensus
around the commons logic among dissenting actors in
transnational fields without necessitating identical the-
orizations and interpretations. We linked these into a
process model, depicting their importance in satisfy-
ing different conditions for the emergence of a com-
mons logic. Coincident behavioral implications, rather
than coincident interpretations, may suffice for collective
action (Donnellon et al. 1986).
Fourth, classic models of diffusion, both relational
and cultural (Strang and Soule 1998), do not suffi-
ciently capture the interdependencies among different,
concatenated actors that are inherent in complex transna-
tional fields as various frames diffuse. In these fields,
domestic and international concerns fuse, interactions
transcend national borders, and horizontal and vertical
relations between state and non-state actors at interna-
tional, national, and subnational levels create new oppor-
tunities for collective action, as seen in global protests
such as the 1999 “Battle of Seattle” (Tarrow 2005). The
diffusion of different frames and counterframes as the
climate commons was being constructed suggests that a
nonlinear model of diffusion is at play in transnational
settings. Unlike linear models, in which social frames
spread through established networks (Strang and Soule
1998), nonlinear diffusion is like a “thousand points
of light,” characterized by a wide range of scales and
constituents, unanticipated perturbations, discontinuities,
and catalytic amplifications (Tarrow 2005).
Future Research
Although actors in transnational fields may engage in
collective action to produce negotiated agreements, they
may fail to establish sustainable norms and practices in
the structuration phase of institutionalization. Thus, con-
sensus in itself is not a “closing act” for institutionaliza-
tion (Lawrence et al. 2001). Future work could address
the sustainability and disruption of consensus in transna-
tional fields. Additionally, it is important to develop
an understanding about what institutional leadership in
transnational commons fields might entail. Given the
wide array of actors and competing logics, distributed
forms of leadership (Gronn 2002) may hold promise.
Finally, institutional scholars may turn to complexity
theory for insights into climate change (Ansari et al.
2011) and other possible tragedies of transnational com-
mons. Complexity theory examines nonlinear dynam-
ics and emphasizes the limits to predictability (Bolton
and Mitleton-Kelly 2010, Levy and Lichtenstein 2012).
Clearly, understanding and acting to avert the tragedy of
the commons requires robust theorizing that captures the
complexity of the fields under consideration.
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Endnotes
1Following Thornton et al. (2012), we have subsumed the
environmental logic under a community logic, because many
of the underlying principles of a community logic apply
(for instance, the premise of interconnectedness). However,
whereas a community logic hinges on social connections,
an environmental logic goes beyond this to acknowledge and
highlight connections between humans and the natural envi-
ronment. Convincing arguments supporting the existence of a
distinct environmental (green) logic (Boltanski and Thévenot
2006, Frank et al. 2000) and a sustainability logic (Dienhart
2010) have also been made.
2We adopt a “distributed” view of institutional entrepreneur-
ship, emphasizing the collective dimension of the institution-
alization process (Lounsbury and Crumley 2007, Wijen and
Ansari 2007).
3The 1970 Study of Critical Environmental Problems and the
1971 Study of Man’s Impact on Climate were hallmark publi-
cations coordinated by Wilson.
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4However, according to our interviews, other actors noted BP
backsliding on its commitment to renewable energy. BP termi-
nated its membership in the proactive US Climate Action Part-
nership in 2010 (Power and Casselman 2010) and continues
donating to the climate-skeptic trade association American
Petroleum Industry (Macalister 2009).
5We use the term “recursive” because some shocks may be
the long-term results of human actions (such as an increase
in adverse weather conditions due to human-induced climate
change or a financial crisis caused by actors flooding the
market with junk bonds). The underlying assumption is that
social conduct can both alter and be altered by natural pro-
cesses (Grundmann and Stehr 2010), just like social struc-
ture is both the medium and the outcome of the events that
transpire (Giddens 1979, Hoffman and Ocasio 2001).
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